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Levin and Golash: Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal District Courts

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS*
A. LEo LEvIN**
DEIRDRE GOLASH***

As recently amended, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(7) invites the
parties to a lawsuit to consider "use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the
dispute."' This invitation can be expected to be a powerful stimulant to increased use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the federal courts. The
amendment also reflects the acceptance alternatives already have gained and is
evidence of the change in judicial attitudes toward ADR. The judiciary, which
once viewed private adjudication as an infringement on the jurisdiction of the
courts,2 now sees alternatives as offering welcome relief to the courts while
providing significant advantages to litigants.3 Proliferation of alternative dispute
resolution programs has resulted in widespread interest in how they work and
what they can be expected to accomplish.
Understandably, there has been no chorus of unanimous acclaim. Litigants
required to participate in ADR programs have challenged the legality of the
new procedures, 4 and commentators have questioned the wisdom of altering
what they view as the traditional roles of courts and judges.5 The purpose of
this paper is to describe the programs currently in use in the federal courts,"

*
This article is a revised and expanded version of an address by A. Lco Levin at thc
University of Florida College of Law on September 13, 1984. The authors wish to thank Professor
Frank E.A. Sander and Dr. Russell Wheeler for their helpful suggestions. The opinions expressed
herein arc those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Judicial Center. On matters
of policy the Center speaks only through its Board.
** Director, Federal Judicial Center. B.A., 1939, Yeshiva College; J.D., 1942, University of
Pennsylvania. LL.D., 1960, Yeshiva University; LL.D., 1980, New York Law School.
*** Assistant to the Director, Federal Judicial Center. A.B., 1970, Barnard College; Ph.D,
1977, University of Maryland; J.D., 1983, Georgetown University.
1. As amended effective August 1, 1983, FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) states that participants at
any pretrial conference may consider and act on "the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute."
2. See Nejelski & Zeldin, Court-Annered Arbitration in the Federal Courts: The Philadelphia Story, 42
MD. L. REv. 787, 791 n.19 (1983).
3. See, e.g., W. BURGER, 1984 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 15-16; 11 NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS REPORT 1, Sept. 1984, col. 3 (reporting adoption of resolution endorsing
court-annexed arbitration by Conference of Chief Justices); Re, The Administration of Justice and the
Courts, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1, 7 (1984).
4. See infra notes 121, 129-35, 141-46 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g, Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96
HARV. L. REv. 374, 386-413 (1982). But cf. Flanders, Blind Umpires - A Response to Professor Resnik,
35 HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1984).
6. This paper's survey of programs implemented by local court rules does not include the
many instances in which an individual judge may enter an order in a particular case providing
for an alternative procedure. Thus Judge Lambros notes that judges in ten other districts have
used the summary jury trial. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute
Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461, 475-76 (1985). Most of these jurisdictions, however, do not have local
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to assess, albeit in very preliminary fashion, what they appear to achieve, and
to explore the legal bases for the promulgation of these programs. Because
provisions for sanctions are so often an integral part of the programs themselves,
we explore as well the legal foundation for fees and fines imposed by judges
in the effort to make these programs work.
Alternative dispute resolution is an umbrella term; it encompasses a wide
variety of techniques that range from informal, voluntary mediation to courtmandated arbitration that incorporates many of the formalities of trial. 7 Under
the same umbrella are small-claims procedures designed to accommodate pro se
litigants, and the mini-trial, developed to serve the ends of corporate disputants
anxious to reduce litigation costs and preserve business relationships.

rules explcitly providing for that procedure.
The survey also omits discussion of state-law ADR mechanisms required of federal litigants
under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Several circuit courts have required federal
litigants in diversity cases to comply with such procedures where they are mandated under state
law. See Feinstein v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 643 F.2d 880, 888 (1st Cir. 1981) (Massachusetts
malpractice procedures); DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Mem. Hosp., 628 F.2d 287, 291
(4th Cir. 1980) (Virginia procedures); Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131, 141 (3d Cir. 1979)
(Pennsylvania procedures); Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 603 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 1979) (Indiana
procedures); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1169-70 (5th Cir. 1979) (Florida procedures). Although the Florida and Pennsylvania procedures have since been invalidated by state
courts, see Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421
A.2d 190 (1980), the rationale of these cases remains applicable. See Kanouse v. Westwood Obstetrihal
& Gynecological Assoc., 505 F. Supp. 129, 132 (D.NJ 1981) (applying Edelson rationale
to New Jersey procedures)
Before the First Circuit's dccision in Feinstein, the Rhode Island district court had held in
Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978), that a Rhode Island procedure requiring
referral of malpractice actions to a panel appointed by the state court could not be applied by
federal courts as such a procedure would amount to an ouster of federal jurisdiction over the action.
The Fetnstein court, while not treating the specifics of the Rhode Island statute, which was not
before it,disagreed with some of Wheeler's reasoning. 643 F.2d at 887 n.10. Subsequently, Rhode
Island modified its procedure to require, instead of panel screening, a preliminary hearing before
a state judge. See Hibbs v Yashar, 522 F. Supp. 247, 249 (D R.I. 1981). The judge could dismiss
the action with prejudice at that hearing if he or she found the injury was "an unfortunate medical
result " Id The Rhode Island district court found the new procedure inapplicable in federal cases
Id at 254. Thereafter, the Rhode Island Supreme Court invalidated the procedure on equal protection grounds, holding that the procedure arbitrarily required differential treatment of medical
malpractice plaintiffs in the absence of a legislative finding of a medical malpractice crisis. Boucher
v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 93 (R.I. 1983). That court also indicated that the statute was probably
in violation of the right to jury trial. Id at 91 n.13.
7
See generally S. MARKS, E. JOHNSON, JR., & P. SZANTON, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMIERICA
PROCESSES IN EvOLUTION (1984).
8. The "mini-trial" procedure, described in Green, Marks & Olson, Settling Large Case LitigationAn Alternate Approach, 11 Lov. L.A.L. REV 493, 501-11 (1978), is really not a trial at all
Rather, it is an opportunity for litigants to hear a compact presentation of both sides of rhe dispute,
so that they may enter into informed settlement discussions. It is especially well-suited to disputes
involving highly technical evidence or disputes between parties who must maintain a continuing
business relationship. Because the procedure is initiated and controlled by the parties, it may take
any form mutually agreed on. See generally Green, CPR Legal Program Mini-Trial Handbook, in CENTER
FOR

PUBLIC

RESOURCES,

CORPORAT.

DISPUTE

MANAGEMENT

MH-1

to MH-124 (1982).

One of the first mini-trials was initiated by TRW, Inc., in an effort to end a four-year dispute
that had already cost several hundred thousand dollars in legal fees. In that case, the parties
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At first blush, there appears to be no common principle underlying these
diverse programs. There is not only a diversity of mechanisms, but a diversity
of articulated goals as well. For example, a primary purpose of neighborhood
justice centers is to further a sense of community in the constituencies they
serve,5 while programs originating within the court system tend to be concerned
primarily with relieving court congestion and delay," All ADR programs, however, seek to resolve disputes through some method other than a formal, adversary trial." Some programs succeed in avoiding litigation altogether; they
are alternatives to bringing suit. In others, the ADR mechanism may be invoked
only after pretrial proceedings have been completed. All ADR programs, however, have at least this much in common: they reflect the premise that alternative
resolution of the dispute is preferable to trialY2 In short, there may be as many
goals for alternative methods of dispute resolution as there are reasons for
wanting to avoid trial.
Resorting to an alternative instead of proceeding to trial is not an end in
itself, and certainly is not preferable in all cases. For some types of problems,
and for some purposes, a formal trial is best. Sometimes the needs of litigants
can be satisfied only by jury verdicts or by formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. Additionally, in some situations, only a judicial decision with

employed a respected former judge as a neutral advisor and scheduled a two-day hearing. The
rules of evidence were not to apply. Each side detailed its case through presentations by attorneys,
expert witnesses, and employees. There was an open question and answer session at the end. The
neutral advisor facilitated the process with questions and comments. Finally, the clients, who had
attended the whole proceeding, met to discuss settlement. Settlement was reached within one-half
hour. Id. at MH-22 to MH-25.
In another successful mini-trial, also involving TRW as a litigant, no neutral advisor was
used. Instead, because of the highly technical nature of the factual issues, the parties agreed to
exchange briefs and then to meet to hear presentations by both sides. Senior officials with power
to enter into settlement agreements heard the presentations. This technically complex, multimilliondollar dispute was settled within a week after the mini-trial. Two of the lawyers pointed out other
substantial advantages of the procedure: freeing of key personnel required to participate in the
litigation; continuation of amicable relations between the litigants, who had an ongoing business
relationship; and substantial saving of litigation expenses. Parker & Radoff, The Mini-ffearing: An
Alternative to Protracted Litigation of Factually Complex Disputes, 38 Bus. LAw. 35 (1982).

A court-annexed version of the mini-trial is used in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas
in Ohio. Under that program, factually simple cases are set down for a pre-recorded videotape
trial. The testimony of key witnesses is taped according to a fixed schedule. This enables counsel
for both sides to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases early in the pretrial
process. The result is a higher incidence of settlement. The number of pending civil cases decreased
36% from 1974 to 1984, although filings increased 18% during the same period. Bedlin & Nejelski,
Unsettling Issues About Settling Civil Cases: Examining "Doomsday Machines,"

"Quick Looks" and Other

Modest Proposals, 68
9.

See

JUDICATURE 9, 29 (June-July 1984).
AMERICAN BAR Ass'N SPECIAL COMM. ON DisuTE REsOLUTION, PROBLEM SOLVING THROUGH

57-68 (1984).
See, e.g., E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION
FEDERAL DisTRmiT COURTS 5 (rev. ed. 1983).

MEDIATION

10.

OF COURT-ANNEXED

ARBITRATION IN THREE

11. Compare the discussion of the purposes of ADR in Professor Sander's article (this issue).
12. Discovery provides an apt analogy. There are many techniques ranging from oral depositions on written interrogatories to requests for admission. There are many purposes for invoking
each of these, but there is nonetheless unifying principle applicable to all of them: the pretrial
discovery of facts, opinions and litigation positions.
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precedential value can provide guidance for other litigants resolving similar
disputes. The challenge for those who develop and administer ADR programs
is to make optimal use of the programs without supplanting judicial decisionmaking where it, in fact, is the most appropriate mechanism to resolve the
particular dispute.
I.
A.

THE PROGRAMS

Court-Annexed Arbitration

In 1978, three federal district courts established experimental programs of
court-annexed arbitration at the request of the Department of Justice, with funds
provided by Congress." These programs continue today in two of the three
courts 4 - the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of
California - and Congress recently approved funding for similar programs in
eight additional districts."
In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, all civil cases seeking only money
damages not in excess of $75,000,"' except social security cases and prisoners'

13
Nejelski & Zeldin, supra note 2, at 799.
14
The District of Connecticut dropped out of the program in February 1981 Nejelski &
Zeldin, supra note 2, at 799-800 n.77. The program had a low rate of eligible cases (8%) and a
high rate of demand for trial de novo among the small number in which there was an arbitration
award (13 of 20 cases). Id.
15. Judiciary Appropriation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-411, tit. IV, 98 Stat. 1545, 1570-73
(1984). These programs have been funded as experimental pilot programs. The additional districts
are the Middle District of Florida, the Middle District of North Carolina, the Western District of
Texas, the Western District of Missouri, the Eastern District of New York, the Western District
of Oklahoma, the District of New Jersey and the Western District of Michigan.
Since the arbitration programs are still in the experimental stage, there was no attempt to
develop uniformity, and there are substantial variations in their specific features. The jurisdictional
ceilings vary from $50,000, D.N.J. R. 47(C)(1), to $150,000, N.D.N.C. R. 602(a)(I). The most
common ceiling is at $100,000. E.g., N.D. CAL. R. 500-2(a)(i)(A). The compensation of paid
arbitrators varies from a fixed rate of $75 per case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, E.D.
PA. Civ. R. 8, § 2, to a maximum of $640 per case, depending on the time spent, in the Middle
District of North Carolina. M.D.N.C. R. 604(d). Five districts provide for the payment of the
arbitration fee by a party requesting trial de novo who fails to improve his position at trial. N.D.
CAL. R. 500-7(c); M.D. FLA. R. 8.06(d); M.D.N.C. R. 610(e); E.D. PA. Civ. R. 8, § 7(d); W.D.
TEx. R. 300-9(h)(3). The District of New Jersey similarly provides for forfeiture of a $250 deposit
in the same circumstances. D.N.J. R. 47(G)(3). The Western District of Oklahoma establishes a more
severe sanctions provision requiring payment of the arbitration fee in case of failure to make any improvement in one's position and allowing the court to impose attorney's fees upon motion of the
opposing party for failure to improve that position by more than 10%. W.D. OKLA. R. 43(p).
The Western District of Texas provides for sanctions, including striking of a demand for trial de
novo, for failure to appear at the arbitration hearing or to participate in a meaningful manner.
W.D. TEx. R. 300-9(0(2). The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has a similar rule, E.D. PA. Civ.
R. 8, § 5(c). See also M.D.N.C. R. 607(i).
The Southern District of Ohio also has a court-annexed arbitration program, initiated without
Administrative Office funding. See S.D. OHIo ORDER 85-1 (Jan 1, 1985). Arbitrators in that district
serve without compensation. Id
16. There is a presumption that damages do not exceed $75,000 unless counsel certifies to
the contrary. E.D. PA. Civ. R. 8, § 3(C). If the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 the parties
may voluntarily submit the dispute to the arbitration process. Id. § 3(B).
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civil rights cases, are automatically assigned for arbitration. 7 Cases are heard
by a panel of three arbitrators, members of the bar of the court,", who hear
evidence as well as argument. 19If neither party objects to the arbitrators' award"
the court enters judgment on the award.2 ' Any party dissatisfied with the award
may request a trial de novo,"" which will be conducted as though no arbitration
had occurred. 2 The party requesting the trial de novo must post a deposit in
the amount of the arbitrators' fees; the deposit will be forfeited to the government unless that party improves on the arbitrators' award at trial. 4 Because
these fees amount only to $225, "2 however, the sanction is minimal in comparison
to the amount at stake, certainly in cases at the upper end of the scale.
The aims of court-annexed arbitration are to reduce the cost of litigation,
to facilitate speedy disposition of claims, and to reduce the overall number of
cases going to trial. 2 6 Measured by these standards, and by the level of satisfaction of both bench and bar, court-annexed arbitration has done well. A
Federal Judicial Center study by Lind and Shapard originally published in 1981,
and updated in 1983, indicates that, after adoption of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania program, eighteen percent more cases were terminated within one
27
year after filing.

17. Id. 5 3. The scope of the rule was expanded January 1, 1985. Before the amendment,
arbitration was limited to specified types of cases and the ceiling was $50,000. R. Broderick,
Operation of the Arbitration Program, Compulsory Arbitration, United States District Court, Eastem District of Pennsylvania, at I (materials prepared for Federal Judicial Center Seminar on CourtAnnexed Arbitration, San Antonio, Texas, March 15, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Compulsory Arbitration].
18. E.D. PA. Civ. R. 8, 5 1. The Advisory Board on the Use of Volunteer Lawyers to
Supplement Judicial Resources of the National Center for State Courts has published a set of
GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF LAWYERS

To

SUPPLEMENT JUDICIAL RESOURCES

(1984). The guidelines

cover such matters as qualifications, compensation, and types of cases in which use of judicial
adjuncts is appropriate.
19. E.D. PA. Civ. R. 8, 5 5.
20. The decision is in the form of a one-sentence judgment. No opinion or findings of fact
are filed. R. Broderick, Compulsory Arbitration 3 (7th Cir. Jud. Conf. May 15, 1984) (on file
at the Federal Judicial Center).
21. E.D. PA. Civ. R. 8, 5 6.
22. Id.7. Prior participation in the arbitration hearing is required, however. See id. S 5(c).
23. The rules of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania provide:
At the trial de novo, the court shall not admit evidence that there had been an arbitration
proceeding, the nature or amount of the award, or any other matter concerning the conduct
of the arbitration proceeding, except that testimony given at an arbitration hearing may
be used for impeachment at a trial de novo.

Id. 5 7(c).
24. Id. 5 7(d).
25. The arbitrators' fees of $75 each will amount to $225 for the panel of three arbitrators.
Although, in the case of a protracted hearing, the court will "entertain a petition for higher
compensation," see E.D. PA. Civ. R. 8, 5 2, most hearings are completed in one day. Nejelski
& Zeldin, supra note 2, at 803. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania rules further provide: "Upon
making a demand for trial de novo, the moving party shall, unless permitted to proceed in fornia

pauperis, deposit with the clerk of court a sum equal to the arbitration fees of $75.00 for each
arbitrator as provided in Section 2." E.D. PA. Civ. R. 8, § 7(d).
26. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 10, at 1, 5.
27. In a comparison group of cases filed before the arbitration program began, 50% of cases
terminated within one year. After institution of the program, fifty-nine percent of comparable cases
terminated within one year. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 10, at 76.
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An analysis of the number of terminations month by month after filing
shows increased early dispositions for each month from the first through the
twentieth, 28 and the authors suggest that the eighteen percent figure "underestimates the true effect of arbitration."- 29 The time savings result primarily from
an increase in early settlement. It is the operation of the program, with its promise
of a timely hearing, rather than the hearing itself that appears responsible for
the early terminations."' It should also be observed, however, that the number
of cases in the arbitration program requiring a trial is strikingly low. By December 1984, just two percent of the 7100 terminated cases in the arbitration
program" had gone to trial.'2
Determining whether court-annexed arbitration results in lower litigation
costs to the parties is a complex undertaking. In their 1981 report, Lind and
Shapard stated: "We would be confident that expenses [to litigants] are generally
reduced if the rule both reduces the incidence of trials and causes a large number
of settlements in advance of the arbitration hearing itself."" The 1983 update
of the report indicates that these criteria may well be satisfied. 4 Even if arbitration allows lawyers to spend less time on each dispute, however, the savings
are not necessarily passed on to the parties. Recent research by the American
Bar Association's Action Commission, in a study of state court innovations
designed to save attorney time, showed that attorneys who were paid on an
hourly basis - most typically representing defendants - did reduce their fees
when time was saved."' Nevertheless, the Commission also found that plaintiffs'
28. Id. at 49, Fig. 2.
29. Id. at 76; see also id. at 48 n.l1.
30
Id. at 78-79.
31
Of 7,881 cases placed in the arbitration program from 1978 to 1984, 7,088 had been
terminated by December 31, 1984. Of these, 142 (2.03%) had been terminated by trial de novo
There is no reason to believe that the outcomes of currently pending cases will significantly increase
this percentage. While available data do not indicate the length of time cases in the program have
been pending, we note that the 79.3 pending cases include all 1984 filings. Moreover, in 327 of
these, the issue had not yet been joined; in 170 the complaint had not been served and in another
157 the answer had not yet been filed. Office of CLERK OF COURT, 83 MONTHS (FEB. 1, 1978 TO
DEC. 31,
1984) OF COURT-ANNEXED COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: U.S. DISTRICT COURT - EASTERN
DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA (statistical summary on file at the Federal Judicial Center). COMPuLSORY
ARBITRATION, Supra NOTE 17, AT 94.
32. Id. Perhaps in part as a result of the reduced incidence of trial, juror costs in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania have gone down from $2.4 million in 1979 to $1.24 million in 1984.
Whether the elapsed time from filing to termination for cases in which there has been a trial de
novo will be longer than if no arbitration hearing had been held will depend on the practices of
the court with respect to scheduling of arbitration hearings, of trials de novo, and finally, of cases
on the general civil docket. The same is true with respect to cases in which a trial de novo is
requested but the case is settled before a trial begins.
If a court gives expedited treatment to previously arbitrated cases, they may still be terminated
more rapidly, on the average, than those on the general civil docket. Moreover, this practice results
in fcwer demands for trial de novo, discouraging requests made simply for the purpose of delay,
and thus will have the effect of expediting the trial of cases not in the arbitration program.
33. E. LIND & J. SH-APARD, supra note 10, at 13.
34. See id. at 140 (incidence of trial); id. at 78 (terminations before arbitration hearing).
35. ABA ACTION COMM'N TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY, ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS
AND DELAY: FINAL REPORT 62-64 (ABA 1984) [hereinafter cited as ABA AcTION COMM'N FINAL
REPORT]; ABA ACTION COMM'N TO REDUCE COURTS COSTS AND DELAY, ATTACKING LITIGATION
COSTS AND DELAY: PROJECT REPORTS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 19, 56, 240-41 (ABA 1984) [hereinafter
cited as ABA ACTION COMM'N PROJECT REPORTS].
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attorneys working on a contingent fee basis did not reduce their fees in response
to these time-saving devices. Additionally, the use of fixed-fee arrangements
inhibited passing on the savings.3 7 Whether contingent fee rates have been adjusted to reflect the savings affected by arbitration,38 or whether they will be,
is not a subject on which we can speak with any confidence. We do know that
many contingent fee attorneys charge a lesser percentage when a case is settled
before trial. 9 Any conclusion about the precise effect of arbitration on costs to
litigants must await the outcome of future developments and further study.
The benefits of court-annexed arbitration would count for little if the program did not deliver substantial justice to the participants. Agreement on objective standards of justice, however, is hard to come by.41 Perhaps more useful
would be a comparison of arbitration awards with jury verdicts, but this would
be a formidable, if not an impossible task. 4 The best we can offer is some
measure of the perceived fairness of awards in the eyes of litigants. Oni this
standard, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania program has fared well. Most
42
attorneys and litigants view the results of arbitration as fair and reasonable.
These findings are consistent with the findings of the Rand Institute of Civil
Justice with respect to the state court-annexed arbitration program in Pittsburgh.4 ' The reasoning of those interviewed bears some emphasis: given a fair
hearing and an impartial decisionmaker, they preferred a timely, informal proc44
ess to more formal proceedings that entailed both high cost and delay.

36.

See supra note 35.

37. See ABA ACTION COMM'N FINAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 63.
38. Cf. id. (attorneys indicated that if new time-saving procedures were continued, they would
modify their fee structures accordingly).
39. See J. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER, G. HAGGSTROM & M.
ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES

82-84 (1984); ABA

SHANLEY, VARIATION IN

ACTION COMM'N FINAL RE-

PORT, supra note 32, at 63-64.

40.

For example, social philosophers would disagree about whether an arbitration panel which

systematically resolves issues upon which there is room for disagreement in favor of defendants (or
plaintiffs) takes us closer to, or further away from, substantial justice. Compare J. RAwLs, A THEORY
OF JuSTICE 11-17 (1971) (distributive justice as a function of the welfare of the least-advantaged
group in society) with R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 183-203 (1974) (criticizing Rawls'
theory). Nozick offers an alternative model of justice based on voluntary transfers of goods. Id. at
33-34, 149-63.
41. The proper measure for comparison would be not the amount of the award itself, but the
amount of settlement finally arrived at following the award, compared with the probable ultimate
recovery whether it was based on settlement following a jury verdict or on judgment on the verdict
where there was no settlement after trial. See Zeisel, Social Research on the Law: The Ideal and the
Practical, in LAw & Soc. 130-32 (1962).
42. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 10, at 61.
43. D. HENSLER, REFORMING TNE CIVIL LITIGATION PROCESS: How COURT ARBITRATION MAY
HELP 8-9 (1984).
44. The majority of individual litigants interviewed were quite satisfied with the program.
Although winners were more satisfied than losers, a majority of the latter were at least
somewhat satisfied with the program.
The survey also found that most litigants had a simple definition of what constituted a
fair dispute resolution procedure: They wanted an opportunity to have their case heard
and decided by an impartial third party. Most did not care whether a judge in black
robes or an attorney in business attire heard and decided their case. Some Pittsburgh
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A word of caution in interpreting what may be viewed as contrary data is
necessary. Nejelsk and Zeldin report a thirty-four percent "reversal" 45 rate at
trial. 46 Because so very few cases actually go to trial, these findings reflect an
exceedingly small and unrepresentative sample of cases. Specifically, as of
December 31, 1983, only thirty-six such "reversals" were recorded out of 6,081
cases in the program and 1,185 arbitration awards. 47 Clearly, these cases are
not representative; they go to trial precisely because one of the parties believes
that the award did not reflect the probable outcome of trial. Of course, when
a case does not go to trial, it is impossible to know whether the actual result
is the same as one a judge or jury would have reached.
B.

Michigan Mediation/Valuation

With their caseload rapidly increasing - by 300 percent over ten years the Eastern District of Michigan in 1981 began looking for ways to reduce an
overcrowded docket." The Third Judicial Circuit of Michigan had long been
using a mediation program run by the Mediation Tribunal Association, an
independent, non-profit organization created by the court itself. As much of
the increase in federal filings was in diversity cases, the federal court took
advantage of this state mechanism and arranged to refer a substantial number
of its diversity cases to the mediation program."
Under Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 32, cases may be referred
to mediation upon motion of either party or by the court on its own initiative."
Court referrals, rare in the early stages of the program, are becoming increas-

litigants expressed a preference for the three-person panel rather than a judge because
"three heads are better than one." Nor did most care whether their cases were heard in
a formal courtroom, complete with bar and dais, or around a plain wood table in a small
hearing room. As one Pittsburgh litigant said, "I wouldn't care if they held it in a closet!"
For individual litigants what was important was that they had enough time to tell their
story, that the arbitrators paid equal attention to the disputants afford the process.

and that they could

Id.
The time and cost savings effected by ADR procedures will likely be less dramatic in cases

involving large sums in which extended discovery, with concomitant costs and delay, is necessary.
See Levin, Court-Annexed Arbitration, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537, 544 (1983).
45.

By "reversal,"

the authors mean that a different party prevailed at trial than at the

arbitration hearing. Of course, the trial de novo is in no sense a review of the arbitration award.
They did not take account of differences between the amount awarded by an arbitration panel and

that awarded at trial.
46. Nejelski & Zeldin, supra note 2, at 816. A study of state court arbitration in California
reports similar results. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON EFFECTIVENESS OF JUDICIAL ARBITRATION 15 (1983).
47.

See

OFFICE

OF CLERK OF COURT,

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 2

ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED

STATES

DISTRICT COURT

and Zeldin throughout their article, although they do not cite these specific figures.
48. K. SHUART, THE WAYNE COUNTY MEDIATION PROGRAM IN THE EASTIRN l)ISTRICI
IGAN 2 (1984).

49.

Id. at 2-3.

50.

E.D. MICH. R. 32(b).

FOR

(Jan. 1983). This is the summary referred to by Nejelski
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ingly common.)' No dollar limit has been set and the only criterion is that

the suit seek only money damages. Litigants each pay a $75 fee, making the
program self-sustaining' 2 Each case is heard by a panel of three mediators,
one selected from a list compiled by the plaintiff's bar, one from a list prepared
by the defense bar, and one from a. list compiled jointly. Hearings take place
approximately sixty days after referral.-'

Although commonly referred to as mediation, the Michigan program does
not today involve mediation in the usual sense of the word. The parties do

not negotiate, nor does the mediation panel attempt to conciliate the dispute.
Rather, the panel of three mediators, after a thirty-minute hearing - fifteen
minutes for each party - meets with each side separately in an attempt to
reach a mutually acceptable solution. The mediators then confer among themselves and arrive at a valuation of the case, usually within a few minutes) 4 A

unanimous valuation by the panel becomes the judgment in the case unless
one of the parties objects in writing within forty days. 55 A party who rejects
the mediators' valuation but fails to improve upon it at trial by more than ten
percent may be required to pay court costs and the opponent's attorney's fees
for trial." Complex provisions for fee shifting also are provided in situations
where the valuation has been rejected by both parties? 7 In practice, however,
imposition of any penalty is not common.? The program enjoys the support
9

of both judges and attorneys).
The Western District of Michigan has a similar program in place as one

of a number of alternatives available to the court and to the parties."" In that

51. Judges rarely refer cases over the objection of either attorney; some judges apparently are
concerned about the authority of the court to impose compulsory mediation. K. SHUART, supra note
48, at 8-10. See infra discussion in Part I of this article.
52. K. SHUART, supra note 48, at 5-6.
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id. at 7.
55.
56.

E.D. MICH. R. 32j)(1).
Id. 32(j).(k).

57. Id. 32(j)(5). See infa note 197.
58. This is in part because very few cases go to trial after having gone through the mediation
program, and fewer still go to verdict. In addition, penalties are not imposed automatically, but
only upon request by the party. K. SHUART, supra note 48, at 9 & nn.6-7. See infra note 140.
59. K. SHUART, supra note 48, at 13-18. The Michigan mediation program, as it currently
operates, is perhaps better described as a neutral evaluation program. A program scheduled to
begin in the Northern District of California in the summer of 1985 is to be known as the "Early
Neutral Evaluation Program." In some respects, it is similar to the Michigan program, although
there are substantial differences. Under this program, parties will be required to participate in a
session before a respected attorney who is experienced in the particular subject-matter of the suit.
The session will normally take place soon after the complaint is filed and before any discovery has
been undertaken. The purpose of the program is not primarily to achieve settlement in appropriate
cases but rather to reduce the costs of litigation for cases that will ultimately go to trial. The
ncutral evaluator will help the parties and their attorneys focus on the central issues in the case
and to manage discovery efficiently (or to eliminate the need for discovery by identifying areas of
agreement). The evaluators will be unpaid in the early, pilot stages of the program, but as the
program is expanded they will be compensated by the parties. See Brazil, Kahn, Newman & Gold,
Early Neutral Evaluation: An Experimental Effort to Expedite Dispute Resolution,
coming).
60. See W.D. MIeH. R. 42-44.
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part of the state, the federal court itself has provided for the creation of mediation panels."'
C.

Summary Jury Trials

Litigants often are unable to agree on settlement terms because they have
widely differing views about how juries will perceive their cases." In cases where
the applicable legal standard is a flexible one such as "reasonableness," attorneys have difficulty advising their clients with confidence concerning a likely
jury verdict. Clients also have difficulty accepting such advice with confidence."
To facilitate settlement in this kind of case, Judge Thomas A. Lambros of the
Northern District of Ohio developed what has become known as the summary
jury trial."' Under this procedure, each party may present the substance of its
case before a six-member jury selected from the regular jury pool. Each side
is given one hour to summarize the evidence it would be prepared to present
at trial. The judge then instructs the jurors on the law, and they retire to
deliberate. While a consensus verdict is encouraged, if the jurors fail to agree
they may instead report their individual views. The verdict is not binding; its
purpose is to provide a basis for settlement discussions."' Frequently, the result
is that one or both parties realize that the outcome of trial might well be less
favorable than anticipated. Such cases are commonly settled. Although Judge
Lambros selects cases for summary jury trials because of his perception that
the parties are highly unlikely to reach settlement, only four of eighty-eight cases
he selected for the program failed to settle before trial .66
Other federal judges have employed the summary jury trial and some have
adopted variations of Judge Lambros' technique. In the District of Massachusetts, Judge McNaught uses five jurors to assure a majority decision. He permits
live witnesses and some cross-examination. The judge's law clerk presides over
the hearing while the judge sits as a silent juror. After the presentation, jurors
retire and then return either a unanimous verdict or a "quotient" verdict, an
averaging of the individual jurors' valuations of the case. The lawyers then are
permitted to speak briefly with the jurors. Judge McNaught notes that, while
the procedure is generally successful, an attempt to use it in an antitrust case
was a mistake. The abbreviated proceeding did not give the jurors enough
information to understand the issues. After they returned a verdict of $10 million

61.
62.
OHIO,

See id. 42(d).
M. JACOUBOVITCH
APPENDiX

A:

& C.

MIOORE,

JUDGE LAMBROS'

SUMMARY JURY TRIALS IN THE NORTHERN

HANDBOOK

AND RULES

OF THE COURT

FOR

DISTRICT OF

SUMMARY JURY

37 (1982).
63. Id
64. Id. at 1.
65. Id. at 37-38.
66. Lambros, supra note 6, at 472. Of 88 cases selected for the program, 39 settled before
summary jury trial, 45 settled after the summary procedure but before trial, and one settled during
trial. Only one case had gone to verdict, and two were still in negotiations after summary jury
trial. Id.
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
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for the plaintiff, the case was tried - and the defendant won. 7 Judge Lambros
however, reports the successful settlement of a $2.5 million antitrust case after
a summary jury trial. ' Judge Lambros sometimes allocates as much as two
days to summary jury trial in complex cases, which may account for his success
9
here.
In the Western District of Michigan, a local rule authorizes summary jury
trials at the option of the judge. 70 The program, initiated by Judge Richard
A. Enslen, is an adaption of Judge Lambros' program. Several weeks in
advance of a summary jury trial, the magistrate meets with the attorneys to
explain the procedure and to resolve questions about what evidence will be
admitted." Either Judge Enslen or Magistrate Brenneman presides at the summary jury trial, which the principals are required to attend.7 2 The jurors are
7 "
not informed until after they render their verdict that it will not be binding.
After the hearing, the lawyers are permitted to talk to the jurors, and a settlement conference follows immediately.
Magistrate Brenneman points out that the need of some parties to be vindicated by a jury is met by summary jury trial. 74 For example, when an in-

67.

CENTER FOR PUBLC REsoUcREs, CPR LEGAL PROGRAM PROCEEDINGS, JUNE 1984,

at 17-

19.
68. See Lambros, supra note 6, at 472.
69. Judge Thomas A. Lambros, Remarks at Sixth Circuit Judicial Conference, Louisville,
Kentucky (May 14-18, 1985).

70. W.D.
71.

MICH.

R. 44.

Magistrate Hugh Brenneman, Memorandum to Judge Richard Enslen 2 (Oct. 18, 1984)

(on file at the Federal Judicial Center).
72. Id. at 1, 3. In one case the presence of the entire city council as defendants facilitated
their vote to double the previous settlement offer to match the jury verdict. d. However, it turned
out that the case did not settle. Id at .
73. Magistrate Hugh Brenneman reports that, despite his initial reluctance to be less than
candid with the jurors, experience has shown that all of the attorneys and virtually all of the jurors
approve -of this procedure. Many jurors stated that they would not have taken their task as seriously
if they had known the verdict was non-binding. Id. at 4. The issue of candor is addressed in
FEoERAIe
_
icmt. CENTER AnvisoRY 'COMMIT'EE, E.XPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW (1982). The Federal
Judicial Center Advisory Committee on Experimentation in the Law is an interdisciplinary group
chaired by Chief Judge Edward D. Re. As -the Committee points out, "'The obligation of candor
in the administration of justice imposes a heavy burden of justification on any use of deception
in program experiments." Id. at 45. This obligation "not only precludes deception, but also traditionally requires efforts to dispel misconceptions." Id. at 45 n.21. For present purposes, failure
to disclose, -or "concealment," is treated as 'deception.
Deception mnay, however, be justified by the benefits it brings. "The burden 'of justification
associated with deception depends on the significance of the matter concealed." Id. at 46. In deciding
whether to tell jurors selected for summary jury trial that their verdict will not be binding, courts
will want to consider two questions: How heavy is the burden of justification for this lack of candor?
Are the benefits to be gained from the jurors' assumption that their verdict is binding sufficient -to
meet that burden? In answering the first question, possible negative effects to be taken into account
include -whether future jurors, having heard of the summary jury trial, may erroneously assume
that an ordinary jury verdict is nonbinding. In answering the second question, it will be important
to know -to what extent jurors' perceptions of the finality of their decision affect the result, and
whether the parties' knowledge that the jurors had been informed that their decision was nonbinding
would affect the ensuing settlement negotiations.
74. Brenneman, supra note 71, at 5.
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surance company refused to pay a claim because of suspected arson, the plaintiff
sought both payment of his claim and removal of the stigma associated with
the insurance company's position.7 '
The summary jury trial, initiated in January 1983, is still relatively new in
the Western District of Michigan. Preliminary reports indicate, however, that
its success parallels that in the Northern District of Ohio.7"
D.

Mediation

Mediation - the conciliation of a dispute through the non-coercive intervention of a third party - is one of the oldest and most familiar of all forms
of alternative dispute resolution. 77 Mediation procedure is flexible; a significant
variable affecting its success is the choice of mediator. Some mediators are
professionals, and judges may, in appropriate cases, call upon such professionals
to assist in the settlement of pending litigation. 71 Obviously, judges and magistrates who have extensive experience with settlement conferences in fact frequently serve as mediators in conducting such conferences. Accordingly, in this
section we treat mediation broadly, including programs limited to non-judicial
mediators, formal programs involving settlement efforts by judges and magistrates, and programs, such as that in the district of Kansas," that provide for
both.
1.

Non-judicial Mediators

In the Western District of Washington, cases may be designated for compulsory mediation in the discretion of the assigned judge pursuant to Local
Civil Rule 39.1 ...If a case is so designated, attorneys for all parties must meet
once for a settlement conference without a mediator. If this effort fails, the
parties select a mediator from a court-maintained list of qualified attorneys who
have volunteered to serve. Mediation is generally scheduled following completion
of discovery. If mediation fails, the parties may agree to binding or non-binding
arbitration or go to trial. t While use of the program declined after an initial
spurt of activity, it generally is seen today as valuable, particularly by the
lawyers.12 Indeed, the Federal Bar Association has recommended use of me-

75. Id.
76. Of 24 cases referred to Magistrate Brenneman for summary jury trial over a 10-month
period, 16 had settled short of trial, two were still awaiting summary jury trial, and none had
gone to full trial. Id. at 1.
77. For an enlightening treatment of the nature of the mediation process, see Fuller, Mediation
- Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. Rsv. 305 (1971).
78. See, e.g., Arthur, Master Lands Settlement that Almost Got Away, Legal Times, April 22, 1985,
at 1, col. 2 (describing Judge Richard Enslen's use of mediator Francis McGovern to settle a 15year dispute over Indian fishing rights).
79. See D. KAN. R. 45.
80. W.D. WASH. Civ. R. 39.1.
81. K. TEGLAND, MEDIATION IN THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 13-14, 23 (1984).
82. Id. at 12.
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diation in all civil cases." The Eastern District of Washington recently adopted
4
a procedure similar to that of the Western District.
2.

Settlement Judges

The judge who will preside over the trial of a case stands in a very special
relationship to the litigants. The control he or she has over the lawsuit may
cause any suggestion that the case should be settled to be perceived as a threat."s
This certainly is true in the non-jury case, and the problem is intensified when
the judge's involvement extends to suggesting settlement figures or to commenting on offers of settlement made by one of the parties." Litigants might
also be unwilling to divulge their true positions to the judge who will preside
at trial, particularly in non-jury cases.8 7 Many judges, sensitive to the risk that
their efforts could be seen as coercive, have in the past refrained from active
encouragement of settlement. 88 Some even avoided broaching the subject, although a gentle query as to whether counsel have discussed settlement hardly
seems objectionable.Y At the same time, the proportion of settlements to trials
signifies that a calendar can be kept under control only through settlements.!'
Mordover, judges have expressed concern about the waste of resources resulting
from settlements that did not come until the first or second day of trial simply
because the parties had never made serious pretrial settlement efforts. " Some
judicial involvement was recognized as highly desirable, especially when counsel
asked the judge to participate. 12 There were several steps a judge could take
to avoid impropriety or the appearance of it. The judge could limit his involvement in the settlement negotiations, although that might serve to limit the
judge's effectiveness as well. Alternatively, the judge could become as involved
as necessary in the negotiations, but make it clear to the parties that he would
not try the case. As one authority advised, you may

83.

Id. at 9.

84. Id.
85. For example, the judge may control the pace of discovery, the timing of trial, and the
attendance of witnesses, to the disadvantage of either or both parties. See Resnik, supra note 5, at

401-02.
86. See H. WILL, R. MERHIGE & A.
PROCESS 11-12 (1977).

87.

See id.at 9-10.

88.

S.

FLANDERS,

CASE MANAGEMENT

RUBIN,

AND

THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN THE SETTLEMENT

COURT MANAGEMENT

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURTS 37-38 (1977) (discussing variation in judges' involvement in settlement); Bedlin & Nejelski,

supra note 8, at 15-16.

89.
90.

See H. WILL, supra note 86, at 39.
Statistics for 1983-84 show that 95% of all civil cases filed are terminated even before a

trial begins. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
COURTS FOR THE TWELVE MONTH PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 1984, DETAILED STATISTICAL
TABLES, Table C4 app. (1984). While some of these terminations result from dispositive motions
or abandonment, one study of state and federal cases reported, "fw]e were able to find little
evidence that [such] dismissals represented something other than settlement." Kritzer, The Judge's
STATES

Role in Pretrial Case Processing, 66 JUDICATURE 28, 36 n.18 (1982).
91. See H. WILL, supra note 86, at 2, 13.

92. See id.at 9.
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have to indicate the possibility that you'll transfer the case to another
judge for trial if it becomes apparent that, as a result of the negotiations,
you are now prejudiced, or believe one side thinks you're now prejudiced,
to the point where you couldn't fairly try the case."
Another approach is also available. Concerned about these pitfalls and yet
mindful of disadvantages in changing trial assignments, some judges developed
the informal practice of asking another judge to hold the settlement conference."'
More recently, several federal courts have institutionalized this procedure. In
the Western District of Oklahoma, a settlement judge may be assigned at the
request of the parties or by the court on its own motion. The judge, usually
a senior judge, conducts a confidential settlement conference and gives his or
her view of the value of the case."' Attendance of a person with settlement
authority is required. The rule states that "[t]he parties, their representatives
and attorneys are required to be completely candid with the settlement conference judge. .. .""' However, the entire proceeding is off the record and
inadmissible at trial."'
In 1984, the District of Kansas initiated a similar procedure."' In that district, the judge may require the parties to attend a settlement conference conducted by a judge or magistrate. Alternatively, the parties may consent to a
settlement conference before an attorney or panel of attorneys,"" in which event
the mediators are paid by the parties. The court maintains a list of 30 attorneys
qualified and willing to serve as mediators. Attorneys prefer judicial involvement
in promoting settlement to a policy of "abstinence." A recent survey of 1900
lawyers who had recently litigated in federal court by Professor Wayne Brazil
showed that "[a] staggering 85 percent of our respondents agree that 'involvement by federal judges in settlement discussions [is]likely to improve significantly the prospects for achieving settlement.' """' A substantial majority of
those surveyed agreed that judges should try to facilitate settlement even when
they had not been asked to do so."'" These lawyers also indicated their preference
for settlement discussions conducted by a judge other than the one who will
preside at trial, particularly where the judges takes an active role in those
discussions. "",
II.

LEGALITY

OF COURT-IMPOSED

ADR

PROGRAMS

Only one reported opinion records a challenge to an alternative dispute
resolution program established by a federal court."" The legality of that program

93.
94.
95.
Meeting
96.
97.
98.

99.
100.

101.
102.
103.

Id
See zd at 10, 24.
See also H.D. Cook, "Processes in the Federal Courts," Speech to Oklahoma Bar Ass'n
(Apr 15, 1982) (on file at the Federal Judicial Center).
W.D. OKLA. R. 17(h).
Id
D. KAN R. 45.

Id,
See W. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL SUITS 1 (1985).
Id at 39.
Id at 5-6.
Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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- court-annexed arbitration mandated by local rule in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania - was upheld and no appeal was taken.'"" A second case, in the
same court and involving the same program, records a related challenge: a
defendant chose not to participate in the arbitration proceedings and instead
moved for trial de novo following an adverse award." 5 In forceful language the
court asserted that arbitration was not an optional procedure, and that, having
failed to participate in the proceedings, the defendant had no right to trial de
nova. IM
In sharp contrast to the federal experience is that of the state courts. State
ADR programs have faced numerous challenges" 7 some of which have succeeded." i8 The reasons for this difference and, more specifically, for what appears
to be the virtually unanimous acquiescence in the federal programs, are readily
discerned. Most of the state programs challenged have been medical malpractice
programs, which came under fire for their effect on the ability of plaintiffs to
recover. "' The federal programs stand in marked contrast. They are not intended to affect substantive rights; they are designed to expedite dispositions
and, in any event, cause relatively little delay and inconvenience. Such sanctions
as are imposed regularly are minimal, if not nominal."" Risks of substantial
sanctions remain but these are rarely imposed."' When more substantial sanctions are imposed, they take the form of requiring a party to bear the costs
which have been needlessly incurred by the opposing party.'12 Finally, evidence
suggests that at least the lawyers, and probably the parties, are pleased to have
these alternative programs available: dispositions are speedier, litigation costs

104. Id. at 577.
105. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
106. Id. at 714-15. Although plaintiff had made no motion to strike, the court struck defendant's
demand for trial de novo as a penalty for failure to participate in arbitration. Id. at 716. As an
alternative holding, the court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the basis that
there were no genuine issues of material fact- Id. at 715. This case predated an amendment to
E.D. PA. Civ. R. 8 explicitly providing for the sanction of striking the demand for trial de novo
as a penalty for failure "to participate in the arbitration process in a meaningful manner." E.D.
PA. Civ. R. 8, S 5(c) (effective June 28, 1983).

107.

See infra note 122; infra text accompanying notes 124-48 and state cases cited therein.

108.

See, e.g., Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980); Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp.

Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976); State ex re. Cardinal Glennon Mem. Hosp. v.
Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980);

Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Center, 3 Ohio
Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (C.C.P. 1976); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190

(1980).
109. All of the cases in which challenges have succeeded have been medical malpractice cases.
See supra note 108.

110.

For example, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania program provides for a sanction con-

sisting only of the arbitrators' fees, typically $225. E.D. PA. Csv. R. 8, § 7(d); see supra note 25.

111. See K. SHUART, supra note 48, at 9 and nn. 6-7.
112. E.D. MICH. R. 32j); W.D. MiCH. R. 420). These cost-shifting sanctions are imposed
only where the valuation of the panel is unanimous and where the party sanctioned has failed to

improve his position by more than 10%. For a case in which substantial sanctions were imposed,
see Nelson v. Proctor & Schwartz, No. G82-32 CAl (W.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 1985).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1985

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 3
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXXVII

are reduced, and backlogs are eliminated."' The significance of backlog elimination deserves greater emphasis than it normally receives. When trial lists are
reduced to manageable size, cases not suitable for ADR can be tried and access
to justice becomes a reality rather than a shibboleth." 4
With the extension of the scope of ADR in courts with ADR programs in
place, and with the rapid proliferation of ADR in federal courts generally, it
is useful to explore the legal foundation for such innovative programs despite
the relative acquiescence of lawyers and litigants to date. Moreover, Congress
can be expected to consider legislation relevant to ADR in the federal courts
in the relatively near future,"' and in that process basic questions of authority
surely will surface.
Any inquiry concerning the legality of a mandatory program of alternative
dispute resolution must address three types objections. First are those of constitutional dimension. Does a given program infringe on the right to trial by
jury, equal protection, or due process?"" These constitutional questions must
be addressed whether the program has been established by legislation or by
court rule. The legal issues are neither frivolous nor insubstantial; more than
one state alternative has fallen before a constitutional challenge." 7 Secondly, in
the federal system, alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution have not been
authorized by legislation. Those programs currently in place have been established by local rule.'"' They are therefore susceptible to the charge of exceeding
the scope of local rulemaking authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
83.' 1"
The final issue-one deserving of separate treatment-is the authority of courts
to impose sanctions as an integral part of alternative programs. Fundamentally,
this is a question of the limits of judicial power. It can arise in a variety of
situations. In its simplest form the inquiry focuses on the court's inherent power
to impose sanctions for a violation of a local rule, such as refusal of a litigant
to participate in mandatory mediation. More likely to arise and more difficult
to answer is the question whether a court has the power to order a litigant to
pay his adversary's attorney's fees for a protracted trial because the litigant chose
to reject the recommendation of a panel of laymen, opted instead to assert his
right to jury trial, and failed to better his position sufficiently - although improving it substantially, perhaps by as much as ten percent. 20 We address each
of these in turn.

113.

Support for these programs is widespread. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44, 59,

114.

REPORT OF THE POUND CONFERENCE

82.
FOLLOW-Up TASK FORCE, in THE POUND CONFERENCE'

Wheeler eds. 1979).
115. More than one such billhas already been introduced. S. 2259, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.; S.
2253, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
116. See infra notes 124-49 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 108.
118. See, e.g., E.D. PA. Civ. R. 8; E.D. MICH. R. 32; W.D.WASH. Civ. R. 39.1, N.D. CAL
PERSPECTIVES

ON JUSTICE

IN THE FUTURE 299-300 (A.L. Levin & R

R. 500.
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
120. This could occur under the sanctions provisions of the Michigan rules. See supra notes 5658 and accompanying text.
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A.

Constitutional Issues

In Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 12 the district court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania found its court-annexed arbitration program constitutional despite
seventh amendment and equal protection challenges. The Eastern District of
Pennsylvania is the only court to have ruled on the constitutionality of a federal
court ADR program. Many state and federal courts, however, have addressed
analogous issues in ruling on challenges to statutory requirements that medical
malpractice cases be submitted to arbitration, mediation, or screening before
trial. 22 Despite important differences between federal court ADR programs and
the malpractice reform procedures,12 3 these cases suggest questions which might
be raised concerning the constitutionality of the former.
1.

Seventh Amendment

No federal ADR program denies any litigant the opportunity to have his
case decided by a jury. None is designed to influence jury deliberations in any
way, nor will any make admissible the substance of an arbitration award, a
neutral advisor's evaluation, or a mediator's opinion.' 24 Federal ADR programs
do provide for additional pretrial procedures, which are mandatory; some also
provide for additional filing fees.125 Where the added pretrial procedure is, for
example, court-annexed arbitration, the award - a decision based on the law
and the facts - will precede the opportunity for a jury trial.
This in itself does not constitute denial of trial by jury, for the Supreme
Court has long held that the seventh amendment does not require that a jury
make the initial determination of facts. In Capital Traction Co. v. Hof,'2 6 decided
in 1898, the Court noted the amendment "does not prescribe at what stage of
an action a trial by jury must ...be had; or what conditions may be imposed
' 27
upon the demand of such a trial, consistently with preserving the right to it."'
The Court quoted with approval a number of state court decisions upholding
statutes which allowed trial by jury for the first time on appeal.128 Neither Hof

121. 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
122. See infra notes 129-48.
123. The provisions of medical malpractice statutes vary widely. In many instances, however,
they provide for limitations on the amount of recovery, admission of panel findings into evidence
at trial, and abrogation of the collateral source rule. See generally Redish, Legislative Responses to the
Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEx. L. Rav. 759 (1977). None of

these provisions is part of an ADR program promulgated by a federal court.
124.

In some districts the arbitration proceedings are admissible for impeachment purposes, and

only for such purposes. E.D. PA. Civ. R. 8, § 7(c). The Southern District of Ohio permits introduction of testimony at the arbitration hearing on the same basis as a deposition, but does not
permit the findings of the arbitrators to be admitted for any purpose. S.D. OHIO ORDER 85-1 (Jan.
1, 1985) (Arbitration Rule) 11.1. In contrast, many state medical malpractice statutes do provide
for admission into evidence of the results of screening or arbitration. See Comment, The Constitutional
Considerations of Medical Malpractice Screening Panels, 27 AM. U.L. REv. 161, 179 (1977).
125. E.g., E.D. MICH. R. 32(0 ($75 fee).
126. 174 U.S. 1 (1898).

127.
128.

Id. at 23.
Id. at 23-30.
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nor the cases on which it relies, however, assure that an alternative mechanism
will inevitably survive a constitutional challenge based on the right to trial by
jury.
Pennsylvania's experience with a medical malpractice statute requiring arbitration dramatically illustrates that when these programs fall far short of their
goals, litigants may effectively invoke the right to jury trial to win relief from
unduly burdensome procedures. In Mattos v. Thompson,1'2 " the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the compulsory arbitration provision of a statute it
previously had held facially valid,"' finding that in practice it imposed intolerable delays on litigants. The court found that "the lengthy delay occasioned
by the arbitration system ... does in fact burden the right of a jury trial with
'onerous conditions, restrictions or regulations which . . . make the right practically unavailable.' '"" The facts are important. The court found that almost
three-fourths of all claims filed under the arbitration program had not been
resolved, that some had been pending in the arbitration program for over four
years, and that more than a third of the claims filed in 1977 were still pending
in mid-1980." ' The court concluded that such delays were "unconscionable."'"
Matlos is of greater theoretical interest than of practical concern in evaluating
the constitutionality of present federal alternative programs. The determinative
question is one of degree: to what extent may the right to jury trial be burdened
and yet satisfy the seventh amendment? The technical test has varied: some
courts have balanced benefits and burdens to determine the reasonableness of
required procedures,'
while others have indicated that burdens do not violate
the seventh amendment or similar provisions of state constitutions unless they
effectively preclude trial by jury.'" The federal court programs currently in
effect can be expected to survive either test with little difficulty. These programs
are designed to promote efficiency, and the evidence indicates they are successful
in achieving that end. They result in speedier dispositions and reduced litigation
costs.' "' When added fees are imposed on litigants who ask for trial de novo,
the costs are modest;'
so, too, are the added expenses associated with the

129. 491 Pa 385. 421 A.2d 190 (1980).
130. 491 Pa. at 396, 421 A.2d at 196, modifytng Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Philadelphia.
483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
131
491 Pa. at 395, 421 A 2d at 195. Alatts was decided under the state constitution right
to jury trial. The seventh amendment test, as set forth in Ex parle Peterson, 253 U.S 300 (1920)
"that enjoyment of the right to trial by jury be not obstructed, and that the ultimate determination
of issues of fact by the jury be not interfered with." Id at 310. The Matlos court's reasoning
would apply with equal force to a federal court program which delayed resolution of claims to a

like extent.
132.

491 Pa. at 396, 421 A.2d at 195.

133. Id
134.
135.

Eg, Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. at 570-71 n.ll.
See Smith Case, 381 Pa. 223, 231, 112 A.2d 625, 629, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 858

(1955).
136. See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text (discussing effect of arbitration program on
cost and delay). The other programs discussed are also designed to reduce costs and litigation time
to the extent that they replace trial. Proliferation of these programs is itself an indication of their
perceived success.
137
See, eg , E.D PA Civ. R. 8, § 7 ($75 fee for each of three arbitrators).
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preliminary procedures." '' Some programs, however, entail the risk of paying
an opponent's attorney's fees.' '9 This expense can be a matter of concern even
though provisions for such sanctions are rare and their imposition in practice
is rarer still.' 4 " These provisions are considered below in the section on sanctions.
2. Equal Protection and Due Process
Litigants frequently challenge the classification of cases for ADR treatment
on equal protection grounds.14 ' Such challenges have been uniformly unsuccessful, certain state medical malpractice statutes aside. 4 2 Although litigants have
urged application of strict scrutiny on a variety of rationales,' 41 courts typically
138. See, e.g., E.D. MICH. R. 32(b) ($75 mediation fee). See K. SHUART, supra note 48, at 18
(85% of attorneys surveyed indicated that time spent on mediation does not affect overall amount
of time spent on case).
139. E.g., E.D. MICH. R. 32().
140. Penalties were imposed in fewer than five cases in the first year of the Eastern District of
Michigan program, although the wording of the rule is mandatory. K. SHUART, supra note 48, at
9, n.6. In at least one case a court has refused to impose sanctions, even though they were requested
and the case technically fell within the rule. See Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Bieke, 577 F.
Supp. 301 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (no sanction where party lost at trial following award of one dollar
by panel).
141. See, e.g., Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1172 (5th Cir. 1979); Kimbrough
v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576,
570 P.2d 744 (1977); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 111, 256 N.W.2d 657, 668 (1977);
Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 424 N.E.2d 586 (1981); Simon v. St. Elizabeth
Med. Center, 3 Ohio Op. 2d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903, 906 (C.C.P. 1976); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459
A.2d 87, 91-92 (R.I. 1983).
142. Classification of cases for ADR tretment has been upheld against equal protection challenge. E.g., woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1172 (5th Cir. 1979); Kimbrough v.
Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d
744 (1977); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 424 N.E.2d 586 (1981). Equal
protection challenges to medical malpractice statutes were successful in Simon v. St. Elizabeth led.
Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (C.C.P. 1976) and Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d
87 (R.I. 1983). In Boucher, the Rhode Island statute providing for a preliminary hearing before a
Superior Court justice in medical malpractice cases was held to violate the equal protection clause
of the United States Constitution, as there was no rational basis for differential treatment of medical
malpractice cases absent a legislative finding that there was a medical malpractice crisis. Id. at 93.
The statutory scheme differed significantly from federal court ADR programs in that it provided
for dismissal with prejudice upon a finding unfavorable to plaintiff at the preliminary hearing. Id.
at 90. In Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (C.C.P.
1976), the Ohio Court of Common Pleas found the compulsory arbitration provision of the Ohio
Medical Malpractice Act violative of the equal protection clauses of the Ohio and United States
constitutions. Id. at 167, 355 N.E.2d at 906-07. The Simon court adopted the reasoning of Graley
v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (C.C.P. 1976), in which the court found
differential treatment of medical malpractice claimants "with no general beneficient reason apparent," Id. at 320, 343 N.E.2d at 838, reasoning that the statutory scheme could not reasonably
be expected to improve the quality of health care. Id. at 320, 343 N.E.2d at 838. Several other
medical malpractice statutes have been held to violate equal protection guarantees on grounds
unrelated to selection for ADR treatment. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d
825 (1980).
143. See, e.g., Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1173 n.16 (5th Cir. 1979) (claim
for malpractice does not involve suspect class of fundamental right); Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn,
478 F. Supp. 566, 575 n.20 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (right to jury trial); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282
Md. 274, 309, 385 A.2d 57, 77, (interference with right to jury trial) appeal dismissed, 439 U.S.
805 (1978); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980) (right to recover
for personal injuries); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 486, 424 N.E.2d 586,
592 (1981) (right to jury trial).
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have applied the rational basis test, finding neither suspect classifications nor
restriction of fundamental rights.' 4 The classifications created by federal court
ADR programs customarily are designed to include as many cases as practicable
while excluding those in which a full trial appears preferable. ' While various
courts have drawn their classifications differently, all clearly bear a rational
relationship to the legitimate state objective of reducing court congestion, delay,
and costs to litigants.'
Due process arguments are similarly unlikely to succeed in view of the
minimal delays and modest additional costs occasioned by federal court ADR
programs. In the civil context, parties have no constitutional right to speedy
adjudication." 7 Although some state litigants have grounded their due process
challenges upon the right of access to the courts,"4 8 success on this ground under
the federal constitution is highly improbable.'i"

144. See, eg, Woods v Holy Cross Hosp., 592 F.2d 1164, 1173 (5th Cir. 1979); Eastin
Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 583, 570 P.2d 744, 750 (1977); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md
274, 312, 385 A.2d 57, 78 (1978): Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 486, 424
N.E.2d 586, 592 (1981); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 91-92 (R.1 1983).
145. The amount in controversy is one factor. For example, many programs exclude cases
seeking damages over a specified sum. See, e.g., E.D PA. Civ. R. 8, § 3 ($75,000 hmit); N D
CAL. R. 600 ($100,000 limit). The Eastern District of Pennsylvania also excludes social security
cases and prisoners' civil rights cases. The Western District of Michigan mediation program excludes
cases in which constitutional rights are at stake. W.D. MICH. R. 42(a).
146. Limitations on the amount in controversy may reflect concern that, if a large enough sum
is at stake, the losing party will automatically seek a trial de novo Exclusion of certain types of
cases reflects the judgment of the court that these issues are more appropriately resolved by a
court See Court-Annexed Arbttratzon At of 1978. Hearings on S 2253 before the Subcomm on Improvements
in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Comm , 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1978) (statement oi
Attorney General Griffin Bell).
147. See American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel - Las Vegas, Inc , 748 F 2d
1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1984).
148. See, e.g., Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231, 238 (Fla. 1980); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson,
282 Md. 274, 291, 385 A.2d 57, 71, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978); State ex Tel Cardinal
Glennon Mem. Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. 1979); Prendergast
v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 103, 256 N.W.2d 657, 663-64 (1977). In Aldana, the Florida Supreme
Court struck down a medical malpractice statute on the ground that it presented an irreconcilable
conflict between the statutory right to mediation and the due process right to prompt trial. To
protect against excessive delays, the legislature had enacted a rigid 10-month limit on mediation.
Failure to conclude the mediation within the specified time meant forfeiture of the right to mediation.
Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 236. In a large number of cases, however, mediation was not concluded
within the specified period through no fault of the parties. Id. at 236-37. The court concluded that
this arbitrary deprivation of a statutory right was constitutionally impermissible. Adhering to its
earlier decision in Carter v. Sparkman, 351 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), that the 10-month period
provided for mediation represented "the outer limits of constitutional tolerance," Aldana, 381 So.
2d at 238, the court declined to save the statute by eliminating the time limit on-the mediation
period. Id. at 238.
A right-of-access challenge also was successful in Gaertner on the ground that a hearing before
a medical malpractice panel was made a precondition for filing suit, in contravention of a provision
of the Missouri Constitution guaranteeing "justice ... without delay." Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d at 110
149. Access to the courts as a component of due process under the United States Constitution
is of limited scope. For example, the Supreme Court has held that a indigent may effectively be
denied access to the bankruptcy courts by the requirement of a S50 filing fee, United States v
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B.

Local Rulemaking Authority

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2071 district courts "may from time to time prescribe
rules for the conduct of their business." Such local rules must be consistent
with the national rules and, of course, with statutes. In the same spirit, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 83, implementing that statute, permits district courts
to make rules "not inconsistent with" the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defining the precise limits of local rulemaking is difficult. As the Advisory
Committee itself observed, the cases do not provide a clear guide to the limits
of local rulemaking;I " furthermore, commentators disagree on the policy considerations that should inform those decisions.'"'
The finer points of these differences, however, need not concern us because
alternative dispute resolution programs currently in federal courts seem clearly
within the scope of activity not only permitted, but encouraged by the federal
rules. Efforts to promote settlement, such as mediation and summary jury trial,
are designed to fulfill the explicit aim of Rule 16(c)(7). Compulsory arbitration,
while it may be viewed as a mechanism of decision rather than as a means of
prompting settlement,1 52 is also within the scope of 16(c)(7), which speaks of
"use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute."
Litigants can be expected to argue inconsistencies with the national rules,
5
no matter how inconsequential. Some of these border on the picayune.1'.
Such

Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). Similarly, the Court upheld a $25 filing fee for appellate review of
an agency's reduction of a pension, Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 922
(1973). Only when the courts provide the only forum in which fundamental rights may be secured
has the Court held that the state must guarantee access to the courts. See Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971) (courts only forum for divorce).
150. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 339,
372 (1983). The notes were published in connection with a proposed amendment to Rule 83; the
amendment was modified before promulgation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (as amended effective Aug.

1, 1985).
151.

Compare 12

C.

WRIGHT & A.

MILLER,

FEDERAL

PRACTICE

AND

PROCEDURE:

CIVIL

§ 3152

(1982) (stressing interest in uniformity and advocating reduction in number of local rules) with
Flanders, Local Rules in Federal District Courts: Usurpation, Legislation, or Information?, 14 Lo'. L.A. L.
REV. 213, 218, 219, 275 (stressing informational value of local rules, suggesting usefulness in
experimentation, and advocating "maximum use of local rules for management and informational
purposes").
In 1983, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules recommended amending FED. R. Civ. P. 83
to establish a procedure under which district courts could adopt experimental local rules that would
be immune from challenge for inconsistency with the Federal Rules for a period of two years. See
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 339, 370-73
(1983). The amendment of Rule 83 as adopted, however, did not include this provision.
152. See Levin, supra note 44, at 545-47, and discussion supra note 41.
153. For example, movants in Kimbrough, 478 F. Supp. at 566, suggested inconsistency with
Rule 39, providing for trial by jury on demand. The Kimbrough court concluded that Rule 39 does
not provide "a more expansive right to jury trial than the Seventh Amendment," id. at 573, so
it is satisfied by procedures permitting a jury trial after compulsory arbitration. Movants further
suggested the local arbitration rule was inconsistent with Rule 58, providing for the entry of
judgment upon certain events. The arbitration rule provided for entry of judgment unless an appeal
from an arbitration award was taken within twenty days. Id. at 573 n.15. The court concluded
that adding an additional occasion for the entry of judgment did not make the local rule "inconsistent" with the Federal Rules. Id. at 577.
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arguments can be, and are being given short shrift. As new alternatives are
developed, however, more serious differences between local and national rules
may emerge, and it is useful to consider the underlying principles that can be
gleaned from the very few cases in which the Supreme Court has considered
the problem.
"Inconsistency" for purposes of Rule 83 embraces two distinct concepts.
The first is inconsistency in the literal sense of the term, for example, a local
rule that would dispense with the written pleadings required by the national
rules. Included within this concept is adoption by local rule of a procedure
expressly rejected by the national rulemaking authority and rejected precisely
because it was considered undesirable.' '4 Again, such a local rule should not
and cannot stand.
To be distinguished is the proposition that " 'basic procedural innovations'
are beyond local rulemaking power and are exclusively matters for general
rulemaking."' s The argument is that whether or not the provisions of a particular local rule are inconsistent with the national rules, if local innovations
are so radically different from past practice as to be considered "basic," they
are inappropriate for local rulemaking. That argument was made - unsuccessfully - in Colgrove v. Battin, jb in which the Supreme Court upheld a local
rule providing for six-person rather than twelve-person juries in civil cases. The
reasoning of the court is instructive. The change in the number of jurors was
not a "basic procedural innovation";" 7 it did not "bear upon the ultimate
outcome of the litigation."' 5 Nor was it inconsistent with any provision of the
national rules. Accordingly, whatever the applicable test, the local rule was
valid. Sharply distinguishable is Miner v. Atlass, "9 in which the Supreme Court
struck down a local rule providing for the taking of oral depositions in admiralty
proceedings. As already noted, the Court found the rule inconsistent with the
Admiralty Rules because the procedure for taking oral depositions had deliberately been omitted from those Rules."' ° The Court further observed that such
a "basic procedural innovation," conceivably "of as great importance to litigants as many a 'substantive' doctrine" was an inappropriate subject for local
rulemaking. 6' Perhaps at the time Miner was decided there were doubts about
whether local rules introducing oral depositions into a legal field where they

154. See, eg., Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641 (1960) (invalidating local rule providing for oral
depositions in admiralty proceedings; similar proposal had been considered and rejected for federal
rules). Cf. McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1976) (invalidating local rule as inconsistent
with spirit of Rule 16).
155. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 163-64 n.23 (1973).
156. Id at 149.
157. Id. at 163-64 n.23. The Court left open the question of whether Rule 83 does preclude
basic innovations. Id.
158. Id.
159. 363 U.S. 641 (1960).
160. Id. at 648.
161.
Id. at 650.
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History has
were then unknown was a "basic" or "fundamental" change.
2
be.'
can
provision
a
such
radical
how
precisely
demonstrated
Under the standards laid down by the Supreme Court, it is highly unlikely
that any federal ADR program would fail for inconsistency with the national
rules. " Moreover, there are affirmative reasons for using local rules to innovate
and to experiment, albeit within the letter and the spirit of the national rules
and statutory scheme. Development of a variety of ADR programs to be tested
in selected courts, or by individual judges where the local rules provide options,
should be encouraged. A continuing dialogue between bench and bar has been
the hallmark of many of these developments. Evaluations, formal or informal,
are virtually certain to follow, with some change inevitable. This kind of cooperative process, providing for modification in light of experience, is best suited
to the development of fair, efficient, and effective alternatives.
C.

Sanctions

Typically, local rules compelling litigants to use an alternative mechanism
of dispute resolution also authorize the imposition of sanctions."'" Such sanctions
fall into two categories: those imposed for violation of a local rule or court
order, and those imposed for failure to improve upon one's position at trial.

162. The oral deposition, which has become the most frequently used discovery device in federal
courts, is a significant contributor to the increase in the cost of discovery, which in turn has been
identified as a major cause of rising litigation costs. See P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN,
JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 30-33 (Federal Judicial Center
1978); Brazil, Views from the Frontlines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 217, 223-24.
163. The Colgrove court construes Miner's reference to "basic procedural innovations" to include
only "those aspects of the litigatory process which bear upon the outcome of the litigation." 413
U.S. at 164 n.23. Under some ADR programs, litigants run the risk of incurring substantial
penalties for going to trial, and so may accept the outcome of the ADR procedure to avoid that
risk. It is interesting to consider whether an ADR program could be considered a "basic procedural
innovation" under the Colgrove test when the use of sanctions affected the outcome by discouraging
litigants from going to full trial. Whatever conclusion may be reached with respect to the validity
of the sanctions themselves, see infra notes 197-208 and accompaiying text, it is highly unlikely
that an argument premised upon the invalidity of a local rule under the outcome of litigation test
would succeed, especially in the present atmosphere of receptivity to ADR programs. One would
have to construe effect on outcome broadly to include situations in which the parties have forgone
the opportunity for trial. Further, Rule 83 would itself have to be construed broadly to preclude
"basic innovations" - a position the Colgrove court specifically left open. 413 U.S. at 164 n.23.
This done, it would still remain to be demonstrated that the results of the ADR program in
question differed systematically from the results of trial.
43
(p) (attorney's fees and costs may be imposed upon party
164. See, e.g., W.D.- OKLA. R.
requesting trial de novo who fails to improve his position by more than 10%); N.D. CAL. R. 5007(c) (costs may be imposed upon party who fails to obtain more favorable result at trial); E.D.
MIeN. R. 32(j) (opponent's costs for trial, including attorney's fees, shall be imposed upon party
rejecting unanimous evaluation of mediation panel who fails to improve his position at trial by
more than 10%; if both parties reject such evaluation, opponent's costs shall be imposed on any
party whose position is worsened by more than 10% at trial); W.D. Min. R. 42(j) (same as
E.D. MICH.). For a valuable, broad-ranging discussion of sanctions in the context of rules of
procedure, see Burbank, Sanctions in the ProposedAmendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some
Questions About Power, 11 HoFsTRA L. REV. 997 (1983).
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We begin with the imposition of sanctions upon a litigant or his attorney
for not complying with local rules or orders of the court. It is familiar law
that such violations may result in sanctions including outright dismissal,'" the
loss of a right to jury trial,'"' or monetary payments assessed against either the
client"'7 or the attorney.", The availability of a variety of sanctions does not
imply unfettered discretion in the judge. Sanctions must be commensurate with
the violations for which they are imposed; not every failure of counsel will
support dismissal of the client's case. The question of choice of appropriate
sanction is discussed below.
Where an otherwise valid local rule provides for sanctions, it appears clear
that a court may impose them. In Miranda v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,""
the Ninth Circuit approved the imposition of monetary sanctions on attorneys
for failure to comply with pretrial conference requirements."' Moreover, the
court held that monetary sanctions could be imposed without an adjudication
of contempt."' In so holding, the Miranda court rejected the proposition that
the sole authorization for imposing a fine on an attorney is the contempt statute.,"
In a partial concurrence and partial dissent in Miranda, Judge Alarcon argued
that the local rule at issue provided only for imposition of compensatory sanctions payable to the opponent, rather than for punitive sanctions payable to
the court. Because the provision for a monetary sanction was penal in nature,
he argued that it should be strictly construed, specifically to preclude fines
payable to the court."' The Ninth Circuit majority, however, disagreed, reasoning that a monetary sanction is not necessarily criminal in nature, and that,
viewed in practical terms, it is preferable to traditional sanctions such as dismissal, which penalize the parties for the misconduct of their attorneys.'

165. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1961) (dismissal with prejudice); Schooley
v. Kennedy, 712 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1983) (dismissal without prejudice); Jones v. Graham, 709
F.2d 1457 (11 th Cir. 1983) (dismissal with prejudice). See also Transamerica Corp. v. Transamerica
Bancgrowth Corp., 627 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1980) (default).
166. See New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712, 714-15 (E.D. Pa
1983); S.D. OHIO ORDER 85-1 (Jan 1, 1985), ARBITRATION R. 6.1.
167. See, e.g., Martinez v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Co., 593 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1979) (jury
costs against plaintiff and counsel).
168. See, e.g., Miranda v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1983)
(monetary sanction of $250); In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1976) (costs of $1,500).
169. 710 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1983).
170. Id. at 522.
171.
Id. at 521 The case was remanded to give the attorneys an opportunity to show why
sanctions should not be imposed. Id at 523.
172. The Third Circuit originally held to the contrary. Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, 307 F.2d
729 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (sole authorization for imposition of fine on attorney was contempt statute)
cert, denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962). Recently the Third Circuit overruled Gamble. Eash v. Riggins
Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985).
173. 710 F.2d at 525-28 (Alarcon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Alarcon
also argued that the district court had in fact relied upon its inherent power, and that a finding
of bad faith was accordingly a prerequisite to sanctions. Id. at 526.
174. 710 F.2d at 521.
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What is most instructive about this exchange is the narrowness of the disputed ground. All members of the panel appear to agree that, given a local
rule expressly providing for imposition of monetary sanctions, such sanctions
would be proper, From a policy point of view, this position appears amply
justified; monetary sanctions generally are considered less drastic, and hence
preferable to other penalties which courts may impose for violations of local
rules. 17 5 Indeed, the Miranda court characterized a fine against an attorney as
"a relatively mild penalty.

176

We have been discussing sanctions explicitly provided for by local rule. Not
every situation, however, will be covered by such rules. Suppose, for example,
two lawyers decide they will not appear for mediation as ordered by the court,
or a defendant, having been ordered to undertake court-annexed arbitration,
determines to do no more than go through the motions and ask for trial de
novo, - his position improved by a helpful look at his adversary's case as
presented to the arbitrators. The court might well desire to impose sanctions
for such lack of good faith participation.'
Suppose, however, that the rules
are silent with respect to imposition of sanctions, or make no provision for this
precise situation. The question of the parameters of judicial authority is inescapable.
We note and put promptly to one side the contempt power. Willful violation
of a lawful court order certainly subjects the attorney to criminal contempt,"'
and available penalties are more than adequate for the offense.17 9 Some cases
do necessitate use of the contempt power. Criminal sanctions in such cases serve
not only as fitting punishment for the offense, but as a widely publicized deterrent, probably more effective than most other criminal penalties. Those situations, however, are very rare. Even in cases where willfulness can be shown,
judges are most reluctant - and wisely so - to stigmatize an attorney with
a conviction for criminal contempt. In the normal case where there is no reason
for such action, as is true of many criminal sanctions that are judged too
harsh, the court simply does not resort to a contempt citation. In this situation

175. See, e.g., Burden v. Yates, 644 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1981) (characterizing dismissal as
an appropriate but extreme sanction); Jackson v. Washington Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119, 123
n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Richman v. General Motors Corp., 437 F.2d 196, 199 (1st Cir. 1971).
176. Miranda, 710 F.2d at 521.
177. Cf New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712, 715 (E.D. Pa.

1983) (defendant failed to participate in arbitration, so court notes that motion to strike defendant's
motion for trial de novo would have been appropriate). The Eastern District of Pennsylvania subsequently amended its local rule to provide for the imposition of sanctions for failure of a party
"to participate in the arbitration process in a meaningful manner." E.D. PA. Civ. R. 8, 5 5(c).
178. 18 U.S.C. 401(3) (1982); FED. R. CRIM. P. 42.
179. 18 U.S.C. 401 empowers courts "to punish [contempt] by fine or imprisonment, at its
discretion." Severe sanctions under this section have been upheld. See Redding v. Fairman, 717
F.2d 1105, 1117 (7th Cir. 1983) (dismissal of civil action), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1282 (1984); United

States v. Ray, 683 F.2d 1116 (7th Cir.) (three-year prison sentence for refusal to provide court-ordered
handwriting samples), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1091 (1982).
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courts have relied upon their inherent power to enforce their own orders,""'
and afortiori to enforce local rules.
The Supreme Court explicitly recognized the "inherent power of a court
to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices," in Link v. Wabash
Railroad"' almost a quarter of a century ago. More recently, in Roadway
Express v. Piper,112 the Court made clear that judges "have inherent power to
assess attorney's fees against counsel" for abusive litigation practices.''- In neither case was the Court willing to look to the limiting provisions of a rule or
statute as an expression of an intention by the legislature or by the rule-making
authority to limit the inherent power of the court."" More specifically, neither
in Link nor in Roadway was the Court willing to engage in the business of
circumscribing inherent power because of negative inferences from explicit grants
of authority."' Trial courts have not hesitated to apply this affirmation of judicial power in appropriate cases where direct orders of the court have been
flouted,"' and appellate courts have not hesitated to affirm." 7

180. In Link v Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633 n.8 (1962), the Supreme Court expressly
recognized that a local rule providing for sanctions was not a prerequisite to their imposition. Id
Another source of authority for the imposition of sanctions for violation of local rules is FED. R.
Civ. P. 41(b). The rule explicitly provides for involuntary dismissal upon motion of the defendant
"for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court."
Although 41(b) does not explictly mention violation of local rules as a ground for sanctions, it has
been invoked in cases where local rules have been violated. See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins.
Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981). While dismissal is the sole sanction expressly provided
for under the rule, it has been read to permit imposition of lesser sanctions. See Cleminshaw v.
City of Norwich, 93 F.R.D. 338 (D. Conn. 1981). Indeed, appellate courts have typically required
consideration, or even use, of lesser sanctions before resort to dismissal. See, e.g., Raiford v. Pounds,
640 F.2d 944, 948 (9th Cir. 1981); Boazman v. Economics Lab., Inc., 537 F.2d 210, 212 (5th
Cir. 1976); Richman v. General Motors Corp. 437 F.2d 196, 199 & n.4 (1st Cir. 1971); Flaksa
v. Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 928 (1968).
Few courts have explicitly addressed the question of whether Rule 41(b) is to be construed as
authorizing the lesser sanctions, or whether they are instead to be imposed under the inherent
power of the court as a prerequisite to invocation of Rule 41(b). But see Cleminshaw, 93 F.R.D.
at 355. In view of the Supreme Court's characterization of Rule 41(b) in Link, 370 U S. at 630,
as a mere codification of the court's inherent power, it is perhaps unnecessary that any such
distinction be made.
181.
See Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980) (characterizing Link with in the
terms quoted in text).
182. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
183. Id at 765. The Roadway Express Court qualified the scope of inherent power. See id. See
also infra note 188 and accompanying text.
184. In Link, the fact that Rule 41(b) explicitly allows dismissal for failure to prosecute only
on defendant's motion was not found sufficient to limit the power of the court to dismiss on its
own motion. 370 U.S. at 630. Similarly, in Roadway Express, the Court affirmed the power of the
trial judge to impose attorney's fees on his or her own motion despite the inapplicability of a
federal statute allowing imposition of attorney's fees. 447 U.S. at 765.
185. See supra note 184.
186. See, eg., Nesco Design Group, Inc. v. Grace, 577 F. Supp. 414 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
187. See, e.g., Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 765; Link, 370 U.S. at 629-30; In re Sanction of
Baker, 744 F.2d 1438, 1441 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Stanley v. Continental Oil Co., 536 F.2d
914, 916-17 (10th Cir. 1976). Many courts, while approving the imposition of sanctions, have
found the particular sanction imposed too severe. See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court has recognized limitations upon the exercise of inherent
power. Thus, in Roadway Express the Supreme Court upheld the authority of
the district judge to impose the particular sanctions in the following terms:
"There are ample grounds for recognizing, however, that in narrowly defined
circumstances federal courts have inherent power to assess attorney's fees against
counsel. ' "ss Specifically, the Court required a finding of bad faith in the bringing of the action or in the conduct of the litigation. 8 9 Perhaps recognizing that
proof of bad faith could itself be a problematic requirement, Justice Powell,
speaking for the Court, referred later in the opinion to the need to find either
that counsel's conduct constituted bad faith or that it "was tantamount to bad
faith."

'9°

The Court thus introduced at least some measure of flexibility with

respect to the circumstances in which inherent power could be used to impose
attorney's fees.
An element of ambiguity remains with respect to the proper reading of
Roadway Express. Whether the imposition of attorney's fees, as distinguished from
other sanctions, is the factor triggering the need for a finding of either bad
faith or conduct tantamount to it is not totally dear, and the Court was not
required to address that question.' 9' Lower court cases have interpreted Roadway
Express, possibly out of an abundance of caution, as requiring a finding of bad
faith even in circumstances where the sanction imposed fell far short of attorney's fees. 92 The issue is certainly debatable, and there is much to commend
the position that, absent repeated conduct that is reckless, willful or "tantamount
to bad faith," a court should not assert inherent power to discipline, without
some specific indication in a statute, national rule or local rule that the conduct
in question is indeed subject to sanction.
We turn to sanctions that are imposed where the alternative mechanism has
been followed by a trial. Many local rules implementing ADR programs provide

188. 447 U.S. at 765.
189. Id. at 766.
190. Id. at 767.
191. The case concerns the imposition of attorney's fees as a sanction against counsel. The
Court says at one point: "the trial court did not make a specific finding as to whether counsel's
conduct in this case constituted or was tantamount to bad faith, a finding that would have to
precede any sanction under the: court's inherent powers." Id. at 767. This sentence standing alone
indicates a finding of bad faith is in all circumstances a prerequisite to use of inherent power to
impose sanctions. Insofar as it refers to sanctions other than attorney's fees, however, it should
be considered dictum. The fact that the Court had just discussed the applicability of the bad-faith
exception to the American rule (which generally prohibits imposition of attorney's fees on the losing
party) to permit assessment of attorney's fees against counsel, further casts doubt upon the broad
reading of the quoted sentence. See id. at 766-67. But see infra note 192 and accompanying text.
It is also significant that the majority opinion cites the dissent of Judge Biggs in Gamble with
approval. In Gamble, 307 F.2d at 729, a relatively small fine was imposed upon counsel for failure
to file a pretrial order in timely fashion. While referring to the inherent power of the court to
impose the sanction upon the attorney as the power to discipline, the dissenting opinion found
"no suggestion of willfulness" on the part of the attorney in question. 307 F.2d at 736 (Biggs,
C.J., dissenting).
192. See United States v. Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1983); Pennwalt Corp. v.
Durand-Wayland, Inc., 708 F.2d 492, 494 (9th Cir. 1983); Thomas v. Gerber Prod., 703 F.2d
353, 356 (9th Cir. 1983).
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for sanctions in case of failure to improve upon the result of the alternative.
Most of these rules require that, upon demand for a trial de novo, a party pay
into court the fees of the arbitrators, subject to their being recouped in the
event that the litigant improves his or her position at trial.' 93 The sanction of
requiring payment of arbitrators' fees, sometimes referred to as costs, is rarely
challenged and has been upheld. 194 More than three decades ago, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that such fees do not impose an unconstitutional
burden on the right to trial by jury unless they are so onerous as to "make
the right practically unavailable."' 195 In the context of present federal ADR
programs, this kind of sanction presents no realistic problem. Indeed, it may
be viewed as a fee for services rendered, similar to a jury fee, although the
payment is conditional. Determination of such fees can be a matter requiring
careful attention to technicalities. '96 In terms of judicial power, however, this
form of sanction has not presented a serious basis for challenge to ADR programs in the federal courts, nor is it likely to do so in the future.
A few courts, however, have rules that may result in very substantial sanctions in the absence of bad faith or abuse of process. These provide for shifting
of costs, including attorney's fees, from one litigant to the other in case of
failure to improve one's position by more than a specified percentage. Consider
the Eastern District of Michigan rules, which provide that a party who seeks
trial de novo following the unanimous recommendation of the mediators, and
who fails to improve his or her position by more than ten percent, 197 shall bear
the opponent's costs, including attorney's fees, for the entire trial. Obviously,
a protracted trial might result in the imposition of substantial fees under this
provision.' 8 Moreover, a litigant might in fact increase recovery by $10,000
or more while failing to satisfy the requirement of improving one's position by
ten percent. This may occur absent any suggestion of bad faith or any of the

193. See, e.g., E.D. PA. Ctv. R. 8, § 7(d).
194. See Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. at 575-76 (costs provision of Pennsylvania
rule rationally discourages meritless appeals).
195. Smith Case, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 858 (1955).
196. The power of federal courts to assess fees is delimited by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (1982) which
sets specific fees for certain items and in addition provides that other fees may be authorized by
the Judicial Conference. It is clear that the Conference has approved the broad outlines of the

court-annexed arbitration program, seePROCEEDINGS

OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

STATES; 24, 59 (1977).

There does not appear to be any specific authorization for the imposition
of a fee representing the fees to the arbitrators. It is not clear whether such a specific authorization,
rather than approval of the program as a whole, is necessary.
197. Under the rule, a party who rejects the unanimous award of the mediators while his
opponent accepts it must pay the opponent's costs and attorney's fees for trial if the rejecting party
fails to improve his position by more than 10%. E.D. MICH. R. 326)(3)-(4). If both parties reject
a unanimous award, each bears his own costs if the verdict is within 10% of the award in either
direction. However, the opponent's costs and attorney's fees will be borne by a party whose
opponent improves his position by more than 10%, even where both have rejected the award.
E.D. MICH. R. 320)(5).
198. For example, in Nelson v. Proctor & Schwartz, No. C82-32 CAI (W.D. Mich., Mar
21, 1985), the plaintiff was awarded $17,028 in attorney's fees under W.D. MiCH. R. 42(k).
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other exceptions to the American rule.'9 9 A different rationale may support this
result in the Eastern District of Michigan, however. The local rules of the
district limit the reference for mediation to diversity cases, 2 ' and the sanctions
provisions track those in state courts.2 ' Authority for cost shifting under this
provision is found in the law governing diversity jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society,23 2 addressed the problem specifically. The authority of the federal court, pursuant to the Erie,°" doctrine and
its underlying policies, would "clearly hold" not only where the state had a
specific rule or statute governing the situation, but also where the rule involved
was judicially created. 2 4 Accordingly, where jurisdiction is founded on diversity,
it appears that the sanctions provided by local rules such as those of the Eastern
District of Michigan are within the court's authority.2 " 5 Where jurisdiction is
based on a federal question, or where the applicable state law does not permit
this kind of sanction, the propriety of cost shifting must be evaluated in light
of the respective roles of Congress and the courts with respect to shifting of
2 16
attorney's fees as defined by the Supreme Court. 1
Arguably the fee-shifting provision imposes an intolerable burden on the
right to jury trial, inasmuch as a litigant who desires to have his cause determined by a jury runs the risk of very substantial financial sanctions.2 " 7 To
prevail on this ground, a litigant would have to distinguish a large number of
other fee-shifting provisions that have been applied where there is a right to
jury trial.2 19 We have seen no instance of such a challenge.
D.

Choice of Sanctions

Given that a court has the power to impose sanctions, the question remains
whether a trial judge's selection of a particular sanction is appropriate. Suppose,

199. These exceptions are noted in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S.
240, 259 (1975).
200. E.D. MICH. R. 32(a). The rules of other districts authorizing similar penalties are not
limited to diversity cases. See W.D. MICH. R. 42(a); W.D. OKLA. R. 43(b).
201. See K. SHIUART, supra note 48, at 9.
202. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
203. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

204.

421 U.S. at 259 n.31. See also Feinstein v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 643 F.2d 880 (Ist

Cir. 1981) (federal litigant must comply with state procedure requiring posting of bond and its
forfeiture upon unfavorable result at trial as statute creates a new liability).
205. If state law requires the award of such attorney's fees, they will also be required in diversity
cases in federal court. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 O.S. 240, 259 n.31.
206. See id. The Alyeska Court, while disapproving a judicial doctrine of fee shifting based on
the "private attorney general" approach, nevertheless recognized a number of judicially created
exceptions to the American rule, characterizing them as "unquestionably assertions of inherent
power in the courts to allow attorneys' fees in particular situations, unless forbidden by Congress .. " Id. at 259.
207. Such sanctions may far exceed those that have been found "reasonable" in the jury trial
context. See, e.g., Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1179 n.27 (5th Cir. 1979) ($100

fee).
208. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides for fee shifting in the discretion of the court in
civil rights cases. The right to jury trial attaches in some such cases. See Dolence v. Flynn, 628
F.2d 1280, 1282 (10th Cir. 1980).
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however unlikely the example, that a trial judge were to dismiss an action with
prejudice because an attorney failed to appear in person for the argument of
a relatively inconsequential discovery motion. The judge's action would raise,
not the problem of the court's power to impose sanctions, but rather the problem
of the severity of the sanction imposed.2 19 With respect to this aspect of the
law of sanctions, appellate courts have almost uniformly demanded that the
penalty bear an appropriate relationship to the underlying offense. 2 " ' Trial judges
are asked to consider, often on the record, the potential efficacy of lesser sanctions before resorting to the most drastic.2 1 ' Even here, however, a long record
of delay or of contumacious conduct can support dismissal or default without
the preliminary imposition of lesser sanctions. 212 Indeed, Link was an explicit
holding by the Supreme Court precisely on this issue.""
Although some courts, relying on the reasoning of the Link court, will impose
the dismissal sanction for conduct which is in reality that of the attorney rather
than of the party,24 1 penalizing the party for the attorney's conduct is not always
appropriate. 2 " Further, as the Third Circuit recently pointed out in Eash v.
Riggins Trucking, Inc., 2 " a court may appropriately discipline an attorney in
217
circumstances that do not warrant the imposition of sanctions upon a party.
E.

Procedural Safeguards

The Supreme Court in Roadway Express made clear that "[like other sanctions, attorney's fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or without fair

209. See, e.g., Burden v. Yates, 644 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1981) (court must try lesser
sanctions before dismissal where action could not be refiled); Raiford v. Pound, 640 F.2d 944,
945 (9th Cir. 1981) (dismissal appropriate only in extreme circumstances); Jackson v. Washington
Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (dismissal with prejudice too severe where no
history of protracted neglect and possible ignorance by client of attorney's actions); Flaksa v. Little
River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 888 (5th Cir.) (sanction of dismissal reserved for extreme
circumstances), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 928 (1968).
210. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 209.
211.
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 209.
212. See, e.g., Transamerica Corp. v. Transamerican Bancgrowth Corp., 627 F.2d 963, 966
(9th Cir. 1980) (default judgment entered after long record of delay). The Transamerica court relied
in part on United States v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1979), a criminal case in which a
motion to dismiss the indictment was granted under local rule 11(g) which is applicable to both
civil and criminal rules as a result of the government's failure to respond to the motion to dismiss.
The government had also failed to respond to over forty other motions, the responses to which
were due on the same day. Id. at 473.
213. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., Jones v. Graham, 709 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1983) (dismissal for failure to comply
with court orders concerning pretrial conference or to advise court of case status); Nevijel v. North
Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1981) (dismissal with prejudice for failure to comply
with local rule requiring short and plain statement of claim).
215. See, e.g., Miranda v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1983)
(monetary sanction imposed on attorney; court notes appropriateness of penalizing lawyer rather
than client); Jackson v. Washington Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (vacating dismissal
with prejudice in view of possible ignorance by client of attorney's actions; no history of protracted
neglect).
216. 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985).
217. Id. at 565-66.
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notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record.'"'2 Certainly, when it
is necessary to find a preliminary fact, such as bad faith, or to fix the precise
amount to be paid to the opposing party, due process requires the opportunity
for a hearing, which itself implies fair notice. 29 Moreover, it is always possible
that some untoward event or unusual circumstances caused the perceived dereliction. Certainly "satellite litigation" should be avoided, and processes should
be kept as simple as possible, 22 ' but courts should be careful to accord whatever
2 2"
process is due under the circumstances.
Attitudes toward due process have to some extent changed over time. In
Link, the Supreme Court asserted that "when circumstances make such action
appropriate, a District Court may dismiss a complaint for failure to prosecute
even without affording notice of its intention to do so or providing an adversary
hearing before acting. '222 The Court relied on the existence of constructive
notice and the availability of a 60(b)(6) motion as a corrective measure to satisfy
the requirements of due process. 223 While Roadway Express need not be read to
overrule Link on this issue, it does cast doubt upon the propriety of summary
imposition of sanctions. In any event, prudence dictates that a court should
not rely unduly either on language or on a holding when the precedential value
of the case might have diminished over time.
III.

CONCLUSION

There is every reason to hope that alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution in the federal court system will contribute to speedier, less costly resolution of cases. These programs appear to satisfy both the litigants and the
lawyers who participate in them. Because these programs vary so much, and
so many of them are still in the experimental stage, it is too early to make
definitive judgments concerning their relative advantages and disadvantages. We
also need to learn more about the effects of the use of alternatives on the
outcome of litigation, as compared to resort to traditional trial. Both bench and
bar are to be credited for the experimentation undertaken so far. The process
of evaluation, and modification where appropriate, should continue, always in
the interest of "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.'

22 4

218. 447 U.S. at 767.
219. See discussion of sanctions in FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) (1983) (advisory committee note).
220. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983) (advisory committee note) (court must to the extent possible
limit scope of sanction proceeding to record).
221. See generally Comment, Financial Penalties Imposed Directly Against Attorneys in Litigation Without

Resort to the Contempt Power, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 855, 882-92 (1979) (discussing necessity for due
process safeguards in imposing noncontempt sanctions).
222. 370 U.S. at 633.
223. Id. at 632.
224.

FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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